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Can the problems and positions encountered in certain development disputes effectively prevent any mean-
ingful negotiation? Are there situations where a win-win outcome is not achieveable? The analysis presented
in this case study suggests approaches that can be utilized by municipalities to avoid no-win situations.
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Introduction
The siting of locally unwanted land uses, termed
"LULU's," exposes shortcomings in the traditional
limited-participation development review process.
Decision making with respect to LULU's is compli-
cated because benefits typically are dispersed widely
within a community while costs are borne by a
minority concentrated near the offending project.
The typical decide-announce-defend process —
where a developer unilaterally decides to undertake
a project, announces project details in an application
for approval, then defends the project against oppo-
nents in a public hearing — may result in less than
optimal outcomes. 1
This conflict-ridden process becomes a win-lose
confrontation for both proponents and opponents.
Project approval or disapproval may ultimately
hinge on political clout, economic staying power of
the participants or judicially decided procedural
issues unrelated to the merits of the project. If proj-
ect approval is secured, as in the case described here,
opponents may find little mitigation to show for
their efforts and expense, while proponents obtain
approval only after an expensive, time-consuming
process. With any outcome, uncertainty, expense
and delay are likely. Ill will is often engendered
among participants, who may find themselves
involved in future disputes because of past antag-
onism.
This article addresses conflict surrounding the
development of a public housing project in Chapel
Hill, NC. The project and the traditional develop-
ment review process it underwent are summarized.
The process and outcome are critiqued according to
the tenets of "principled negotiation." 2 Barriers to and
opportunities for a negotiated settlement are out-
lined. A framework for an amended development
review process to include opportunities for dispute
resolution and enhanced public participation is
proposed.
The Piney Mountain Project
In March, 1986, residents began moving into 16
duplexes (32 units) of public housing on a 5.5 acre
site on Piney Mountain Road, seven years after the
Chapel Hill Housing Authority was first notified of
the availability of funds and six years after the first
site selection process began. In the interim, the
Housing Authority survived challenges to the proj-
ect in the development review process, allegations
of illegal deal-making, allegations of conflict of in-
terest on the part of the mayor, a court case and an
attempt by neighborhood residents to purchase the
site. Neighborhood residents were subjected to post-
decision disclosure of plans and meager attempts at
public participation on the part of the Authority
which left a legacy of distrust and anger toward
Town decision makers.
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The project began with notification to the Hous-
ing Authority from the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) of the availability of
federal funds in March, 1979. Like many mission
agencies, the Authority tended to define its objec-
tives narrowly: provide housing for some of the 380
families on its waiting list, take advantage of what
the Authority perceived as the last opportunity for
federal funds, and follow a "scattered sites" policy-
avoiding concentrations of public housing.
After receiving HUD funding approval in July,
1979, a site selection committee composed of
Authority board members and the Town mayor was
formed. The committee conducted a site search
through local realtors in February, 1980, one month
after the Town of Chapel Hill annexed the Piney
Mountain Road area. The committee encountered
difficulty finding suitably sized sites that met its cost
and location criteria.
Acquisition discussions with the owner of the
Piney Mountain Road site began in February, 1980.
It was only after the Housing Authority was well
on its way to receiving purchase price and site ap-
proval from HUD that neighborhood residents first
learned of the project — by questioning surveyors
working at the site. Aside from a design presentation
late in the process and apparently some unsuccessful
attempts to meet with neighbors following submittal
of the development application to the Town, the
Authority did not have discussions with neighbors
or other interested parties.
Some area residents formed the Piney Mountain
Neighborhood Association in opposition to the pro-
posed multi-family project locating in their single-
family area. The interests of the Association were
divided, with one estimate that approximately 50
percent opposed any public housing in the area, 40
percent opposed the highly visible site chosen and
10 percent opposed the design. Neighbors favoring
the project may not have joined the Association.
The Association first tried unsuccessfully to pur-
chase the site, then failed in an effort to defeat provi-
sions of a new development ordinance (adopted by
the Town in May, 1981) which allowed higher densi-
ties throughout the Town — and would permit the
project in their neighborhood. Association members
and their attorney petitioned the Town and HUD,
expressing opposition to the project and questioning
whether Housing Authority and Town decision cri-
teria were being followed. While the Authority's
application was winding its way through the Town
approval process, the Association alleged a deal had
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been made to provide public housing for a relative
of the site's owner and charged the mayor, an archi-
tect, with a conflict of interest.
The Authority's application underwent the Town's
standard development review procedure involving
Planning Department analysis and recommendation
(for the project), Planning Board recommendation
(against the project), public hearing, Council vote
(7-2 for the project in September, 1981) and review
by the Appearance Commission. Because the type
of development proposed required a special permit
under the 1981 Development Ordinance, the Plan-
ning Board and subsequently the Town Council
were required to make four affirmative findings in
order to approve the project. These were: (1) the
project was located and designed so as to enhance
general safety and public welfare, (2) the project
complied with all regulations and standards, (3) the
project was located, designed and operated so as to
enhance the value of contiguous properties and (4)
the project conformed to the Town's General Plan.
The Association advocated denial on the grounds
of traffic congestion, negative impact on property
values and an excessive concentration of public
housing in their neighborhood. The Planning
Board's recommendation against approval was
based on the first and fourth findings above; it con-







and that some goals of the General Plan were in
conflict.
Following Council approval, the Association sued;
the decision in favor of the project was announced
in February, 1982.
Principled Negotiation and the Siting Problem
Roger Fisher and William Ury describe in their
book Getting to Yes, a four part method they term
"principled negotiation." Essentially, principled nego-
tiation involves:
(1) separating people from the problem — not let-
ting personalities and egos overshadow the pro-
blem to be solved,
(2) focusing on interests, not positions — looking
beyond the stated positions to their underlying
interests,
(3) insisting on using objective criteria — having par-
ticipants agree on standards by which decisions
will be made,
(4) inventing options for mutual gain — generating
several possible packages of options before mak-
ing a decision.
A review of the Piney Mountain dispute reveals
that the three main parties — the Housing Authority,
the Neighborhood Association and the Town —
violated the four tenets of principled negotiation.
Discussions with participants revealed that propo-
nents tended to regard project opponents as elitist
and perhaps racist, opposing the project out of self-
ishness and ignorance. Project opponents tended to
regard proponents as arrogant and self-righteous,
unilaterally forcing unwanted development in their
neighborhood and unconcerned as to its impacts.
Observers on both sides noted that some proponents
and opponents adopted abrasive, confrontational
approaches, further polarizing the conflict. With
these strongly held images of the people involved,
neither side ascribed much validity to the other's
stated concerns.
The Authority's strategy of selecting a site and a
development plan, then defending its position, and
the Association's strategy of attacking the site and
plan, precluded the parties from focusing on the
underlying interests — the Authority's desire to pro-
vide low-income housing and the Association's de-
sire to minimize adverse change to the neighborhood.
The one instance where the dispute came closest
to principled negotiation— the use of objective crite-
ria for granting a special permit— failed due to a lack
of definition and a lack of options. The Authority's
scattered site policy, legitimized in the Town's Housing
Assistance Plan, specified acceptable concentrations
of public housing in each of the Town's Planning
Areas. Disagreement as to whether the large Plan-
ning Areas were the suitable level of analysis and
whether exsiting or estimated future population
should serve as the basis for comparison were never
satisfactorily resolved. In essence, the parties tried
to bend the criteria to support their arguments for
or against the only option under consideration,
rather than using criteria to generate options.
The decide-announce-defend strategy precluded
the generation of alternatives; the funds were avail-
able, the site approved by HUD and the design well
under way. Without a political or judicial defeat
there would be no fundamental changes in the Au-
thority's plan.
Larry Susskind3 identified four types of partici-
pants in a siting decision. "Boosters" will favor the
project and "preservationists" will oppose it without
regard to specifics of the proposal or the approval
process. "Non-participants" will not get involved. A
significant portion of local residents (up to 50 per-
cent) will be "guardians;" their support for or opposi-
tion to a project may depend on their perception of
the fairness of the decision-making process. Public
agencies need to be careful to maintain their support.
An enhanced public participation or negotiation
framework may be an appropriate vehicle to garner
the support of both local government officials and
citizen "guardians."
Raiffa 4 and Sullivan 5 discuss factors that tend to
help or hinder the use of negotiation in a given dispute.
It is critical to analyze each situation to estimate the
effectiveness of using a negotiation framework. Sev-
eral factors indicate negotiation may have been pro-
ductive in the Piney Mountain case.
First, each party could receive gains from negotia-
tions without sacrificing its best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA): pursuing its inter-
ests through the traditional development review pro-
cess. Because plan review through a public hearing
mechanism would occur anyway, none of the parties
must abandon strategies they would otherwise use.
In addition, willingness to negotiate would signal
to decision-makers that a party was pursuing con-
structive means in the dispute. The review process
provides two other incentives to bargaining: it im-
poses a deadline and it ensures that none of the par-
ties can act unilaterally to attain its goals. A noted
exception would be if one party were certain that
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the Town's interests were identical to its own, thus
ensuring its desired outcome in the absense of nego-
tiation. Some might argue this was true for the
Authority in this case, but it is a risky assumption
to make in the political arena.
Public and quasi-public projects often lend them-
selves to bargaining. Because they are designed to
fulfill public interests and usually involve the expen-
diture of public funds, the property rights of the
"developer" are often regarded as weaker than in a
private development.
Another factor favoring negotiation is the exis-
tence of common areas of interest that are not of
a zero-sum nature. Early input into which objective
criteria should be used to evaluate alternatives and
how much weight various criteria should be as-
signed are examples of expanded participation that
need not involve a relinquishment of power.
Another example is joint involvement in the design
process, where neighborhood concerns might also
benefit future project residents. Design elements
may be of secondary concern to the Authority as
long as cost and scale impacts are minimal.
Given the animosity displayed during the dispute,
formal negotiations may have improved basic com-
munication among participants and helped develop
less biased analysis of technical considerations. Neu-
tral observers would likely conclude that all parties
had legitimate interests and acted in an expected
manner to further those interests. In particular, plan-
ners need to acknowledge that the "not in my back
yard" (NIMBY) response is a rational and legitimate
expression of residents' interests.
Finally, negotiations could preclude conflict
related to lack of involvement, therby shifting the
focus to the merits of the plan.
There are some factors that might tend to hinder
negotiations. Foremost among these involves final
site selection. Regardless of the process or the design,
the neighborhood in which the project is sited is
likely to resist. This results in the "reservation price"
of the neighborhood (no project at the site) and that
of the Authority (some project at the site) being
mutually exclusive. This single issue agenda would
not be conducive to negotiation since one party must
prevail at the other's expense.
In the Piney Mountain case, expense and delay
considerations may not have played as large a role
as they might in a dispute over a for-profit develop-
ment. Carrying costs and the need to satisfy in-
vestors can be a strong incentive to bargain.
There are also "structural" impediments to
negotiation. Among these are: (1) deeply held beliefs
which can preclude productive discussion, (2) the
inability of an interest group to reach consensus or
represent all its member's interests, (3) the unlikli-
hood of future negotiations on a similar project and
(4) fear that bargaining may imply legitimacy of
others' interests, lessening the probability of a
"victory ."
It is also important to recognize that any new ap-
proach to established procedures may be opposed,
largely out of apprehension to forsake something
familar for something unknown, with perhaps un-
foreseen consequences. New approaches also tend
to invite legal challenge until they become estab-
lished. In addition, constitutional or other legal
restrictions may affect the ability to employ negotia-
tion strategies in some states.
Enhanced Participation/Negotiation Process
What we term an enhanced participation/negotia-
tion process must consider several elements: what
interests are represented, who represents them, at
what point(s) in the process negotiation occurs,
what is and is not negotiable; and what role(s) the
planner may assume in the bargaining process.
Four broad classes of interests could be repre-
sented in a typical local development dispute: the
project applicant, the affected neighborhoods, the
local government and other public service providers,
and the direct beneficiaries of the project. State and
federal agencies, among others, may also have in-
terests, but for simplicity they are not addressed in
this analysis.
How interests are represented is more prob-
lematic. The applicant and the local government
tend to have adequate means to coherently express
their interests, but ad hoc neighborhood groups raise
questions of adequate representation. Whether such
groups will form and to what degree they represent
the neighborhood is uncertain. Negotiations may
be assisted by providing a mechanism for neighbor-
hood representation recognized by all participants.
A similar problem arises with regard to project
beneficiaries. In cases where beneficiaries are iden-
tifiable, such as where a waiting list for public
housing exists, representatives should be included,
perhaps using a mechanism similar to that for the
neighborhoods.
The local government's role needs to be carefully





A treeless cul de sac
criteria selection
negotiation steps
a quasi-judicial role in the development review pro-
cess, constitutional considerations suggest that the
council not become involved in negotiations.
A negotiation framework would appear to offer
several roles for planners, however. Planners may
represent town interests as reflected in plans and
policies, with the understanding that the planner can
suggest likely concerns, but cannot assure approval
or denial of any proposal. In this role, the planner
becomes one of the parties to negotiate along with
the applicant and neighborhood groups. Other
duties of a planner in this role include serving as
a liaison to neighborhood groups, either as an infor-
mation broker — ensuring that all interested groups
are kept appraised of project developments — or as
a technical assistant or advocate for a certain group
or groups; preparing estimates of a project pro-
posal's impacts, suggesting mitigation measures that
balance various parties' interests and responding to
comments on the project submitted by the public.
A planner may also serve as a mediator, helping par-
ties to define objective criteria and identify possible
mitigation measures. As a mediator, the planner
may enhance prospects for principled negotiations
as parties may not wish to appear uncooperative
before someone with access to decision-makers. For
example, the planner may suggest side payments or
mitigation measures under town purview that could
further prospects for agreement.
Many of these roles would need to be assumed
by different members of the staff as they contain
conflicts of interest. If parties to a negotiation are
not confident that different members of the same
staff can serve possibly conflicting roles, an outside
mediator may be required. 6
Perhaps the most difficult consideration is the
point at which various participants should engage
in negotiation. Based on the case study, it appears
that bargaining needs to occur between different
participants at different times. This results in in-
herent dangers that negotiations will fail since some
critical issues would be largely non-negotiable. The
incentive for the project applicant to bargain would
be too small, and the incentive for project oppo-
nents to use unprincipled tactics too great, for the
final selection of the preferred site to be negotiable.
This conclusion is based on the earlier assessment
that site selection constitutes a zero-sum issue which
will result in opposition independent of the criteria
employed to select the site. Negotiations can help
determine what criteria should be used, appropriate
mitigation for adverse impacts and site design-
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related details once a site is chosen, but not the
actual choice of the site.
A three step "negotiation on a higher plane" is en-
visioned: negotiation to determine objective criteria
and how they will be used, site selection without
negotiation, and negotiation over mitigation mea-
sures and site design elements. Implementation
recommendations include both steps to encourage
bargaining and changes to the development review
process to better embrace a negotiation framework.
The recommendations are designed to implement
the three-part "negotiations on a higher plane"
described above. Recommendations include:
1. Inclusion of an "Interests of Particular Concern"
section in the General Plan. This section lists types
of projects in which the town perceives an overriding
public interest. Each locality generates its own list,
based on its needs, and may periodically amend it
as needed. Types of projects listed might include
shelters, utilities, halfway houses, public housing
and major public facilities such as hospitals, airports
and waste disposal facilities, among others. The
listing does not supercede the normal review pro-
cess. It signals to all parties that minor to moderate
impacts of a project may not necessarily be suffi-
cient to deny approval, but must be balanced against
the value of the project to the public welfare. This
mechanism enhances the legitimacy of proponents
for listed projects and opponents for unlisted proj-
ects. It clarifies the public interest prior to any
specific development proposals and may forestall
accusations of due process abuse (such a provision
would need to be carefully crafted to avoid a due
process challenge out of hand). If passed, this sec-
tion would alert proponents and opponents alike
of those projects for which some form of negotia-
tion is expected by the locality.
2. Establishment of a recognized network of
neighborhood groups. The network may improve
communication between project applicants, local
government and the public, and minimize concerns
about power and legitimacy associated with ad hoc
groups. The town role could include approval of
organizations' bylaws to ensure adequate represen-
tation, with the following elements required: (a)
notification to all potential members about the
organization's existence and purpose, (b) a periodic
process for the democratic selection of leaders, (c)
explicit solicitation of input to, and notification of,
all public stances of the organization together with
notification of all communications received by the
organization.
The town could appoint a staff member as liaison
to the neighborhood groups, with responsibility for
providing them with information.
3. Early communication with neighborhoods for
projects listed under the "Interests of Particular Con-
cern". The quid pro quo for listing as an "interest"-
which tends to enhance the project's legitimacy —
requires communication between the applicant and
affected parties prior to site selection or detailed
planning. This enables the full spectrum of commu-
nity interests to be raised. The procedure could be
as limited as notification through the media or mass
mailings inviting comment. On a higher plane, balancing interests
notification could be followed by a public meeting
to gather further input. If a network of neighbor-
hood groups is established, a first round of negoti-
ations could be conducted. Negotiations, mediated
by the planner if requested, could identify interests,
determine possible site selection and review criteria
and inform participants of the development review
process. Thoughtful planning and careful attention
to the development of precise, unambiguous objec-
tive criteria by which potential sites will be evaluated
at this step can set the stage for a successful prin-
cipled negotiation.
4. Appointment of a task force to provide advice
during the site selection process. The task force could
be a standing committee which convenes for any
major project siting or a committee whose member-
ship is appointed on a project-by-project basis. Its
role would largely be determined by the applicant,
who would not be required to use task force ser-
vices. It is unlikely that the applicant would wish
to appear uncooperative because of the local govern-
ment's development review role. The task force
would act as a surrogate for neighborhood interests
during site selection. Operating in an advisory role,
the task force would ensure that site-specific con-
cerns are communicated to the applicant, while
safeguarding the confidentiality of the applicant's
actions. The long-term success of the task force
would depend on its ability to uphold confidenti-
ality. Task force suggestions, like those of the
planner/mediator, would not imply town sanction
of any outcome.
5. Neighborhood involvement in preliminary site group network
design and development of mitigation measures.
Analagous to the development of conditions often
accompanying the issuance of a special permit, this
step could involve substantial negotiations. At this
point, the most affected neighborhood may oppose




then be evaluated by the previously determined
criteria. Eventually, opponents will face the decision
to provide input to minimize adverse impacts while
opposing the project during the review process, or
opposing the project without providing input.
Although opponents may argue that its concerns
were not fully mitigated, it cannot charge that it was
denied involvement in the process. The local govern-
ment could thus judge the project on its merits.
6. A written, public analysis/comment/response
procedure for all projects listed as "interests of par-
ticular concern" This final procedure, occuring dur-
ing the development review process, ensures that all
concerns are raised, and responded to, prior to the
final decision on the project application. It would
include the Planning Department's written analysis
and recommendation for the project, available to
the public prior to the public hearing. The public
would have the opportunity to submit oral and
written comments on the project at the public hear-
ing. The Department would then supply written
responses for each comment to the town council and
public prior to the council's decision.
Conclusion
The enhanced participation /negotiation process
described increases public input relative to the tra-
ditional development review process. Where
lawsuits or other delays are avoided, the recom-
mended process could also save participants time
and money and improve community relations. The
negotiation process would take longer and cost more
than the traditional process if both ran smoothly.
Bargaining would tend to focus discussion on
legitimate criteria and establish more useful
precedents by minimizing conflict over process
issues. By expanding the debate, negotiation would
arguably increase the probability that the solution
most in the public interest will be selected.
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